templates/.github/workflows/pull-request-workflow-run.yaml at main · cloudflare/templates · GitHub

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name: "Pull Request Workflow Run"

on:
  workflow_run: # this action runs in a trusted context, but passed info from the "Pull Request" untrusted workflow
    workflows: ["Pull Request"]
    types:
      - completed

permissions:
  pull-requests: write

env:
  PR_ID_FILE: "_pr_id.txt"
  PREVIEW_DIR: "_preview-templates"
  ALLOW_PREVIEW_LABEL: "allow preview"

jobs:
  preview:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    if: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.conclusion == 'success' }}
    env:
      GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
      TEMPLATES_API_CLIENT_ID: ${{ vars.TEMPLATES_API_CLIENT_ID }}
      TEMPLATES_API_CLIENT_SECRET: ${{ secrets.TEMPLATES_API_CLIENT_SECRET }}
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - uses: ./.github/actions/setup

      - name: Download PR ID
        uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
        with:
          name: pr_id
          github-token: ${{ env.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
          run-id: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.id }}

      - shell: bash
        run: |
          # The artifact comes from the untrusted "Pull Request" workflow.
          value=$(cat "$PR_ID_FILE")
          if [[ ! "$value" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]]; then
            echo "Invalid PR ID in $PR_ID_FILE" >&2
            exit 1
          fi
          echo "PR_ID=$value" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"

      - name: "Download pull request info"
        uses: actions/github-script@v7
        with:
          script: |
            const fs = require('fs')
            const { data: pr } = await github.rest.pulls.get({
              owner: context.repo.owner,
              repo: context.repo.repo,
              pull_number: process.env.PR_ID,
            })
            const allowPreview = pr.labels?.find((label) => label.name == process.env.ALLOW_PREVIEW_LABEL)
            fs.appendFileSync(process.env.GITHUB_ENV, `PR_REPOSITORY=${pr.head.repo.full_name}\n`)
            fs.appendFileSync(process.env.GITHUB_ENV, `PR_REF=${pr.head.ref}\n`)
            fs.appendFileSync(process.env.GITHUB_ENV, `PR_SHA_SHORT=${pr.head.sha.slice(0, 7)}\n`)
            if (allowPreview) {
              fs.appendFileSync(process.env.GITHUB_ENV, 'PR_ALLOW_PREVIEW=true\n')
            }
      - name: "Dependency info"
        run: pnpm -w info:deps --pr $PR_ID

        #
        # Note: Checking out the source of the PR means checking out untrusted code.
        # We shouldn't run any tests or package installs past this point.
        # Simply checking out to fetch the files is reasonable, however.
        # https://securitylab.github.com/resources/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/
        #
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
        with:
          repository: ${{ env.PR_REPOSITORY }}
          ref: ${{ env.PR_REF }}
          path: ${{ env.PREVIEW_DIR }}
          persist-credentials: "false"

      - name: "Make preview"
        run: |
          pnpm -w preview $PREVIEW_DIR \
            --repoFullName $PR_REPOSITORY \
            --branch $PR_REF \
            --pr $PR_ID \
            --hash $PR_SHA_SHORT