fix(counterfactual): consume signedWithdrawToUser EIP-712 digests - #1517
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SashaMIT wants to merge 1 commit into
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fix(counterfactual): consume signedWithdrawToUser EIP-712 digests#1517SashaMIT wants to merge 1 commit into
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signedWithdrawToUser checked deadline and signer recovery but never marked an authorization as used, so the same signature could drain a re-funded counterfactual clone until the deadline. Record the digest before the external execute call. Signed-off-by: Sasha Mitchell <sash.t.mitchell@gmail.com>
SashaMIT
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bmzig,
mrice32,
nicholaspai and
pxrl
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August 8, 2026 04:32
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Summary
AdminWithdrawManager.signedWithdrawToUserverified deadline + signer recovery but never consumed the authorization.deadline.usedSignatures[digest] = trueafter recovery and before the externalexecutecall, and reverts withSignatureAlreadyUsedon reuse. TYPEHASH is unchanged (one-shot digests; new withdrawals use a new deadline).Impact if unsolved
Anyone holding a valid signed-withdraw authorization (or observing one on-chain) can drain subsequent deposits to the same clone for the same
(token, amount)while the deadline remains open. Recipient stays forced to the leafuser, so this is repeated user payout / grief of re-deposited funds rather than theft to an attacker address, but it breaks the one-authorization-one-use expectation of a deadline-bound signed withdraw.Test plan
testSignedWithdrawToUserReplayAfterRefund: drain → re-fund → same sig revertsSignatureAlreadyUsed.AdminWithdrawManagerTest11/11 pass (forge test --match-contract AdminWithdrawManagerTest).Reported via Elacity CodeRED Amber review.
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